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A N EW N UCLEAR THREAT: THE T ENTH CIRCUIT'S
SHOCKING MISINTERPRETATION OF PREEMPTION
DEMANDING AN AMENDMENT TO THE
PRICE-ANDERSON AcT
Stephanie Fishman*

I NTROD UCTIO N

N

uc lea r p owe r will be th e key to Am e rica ' s e ne rgy
future. Whi le we still li ve in the wake of Sov ie t-era
nucl ear ste reotypes, th e ho rror of C hern obyl, and face
dil e mm as o n wh ere to store the waste, nuc lear energy is the safest, c leanest, a nd most reli ab le source. 1 A nuclear energy fac ility
can produce e nergy at a ninety-o ne pe rcent e ffic iency ra te, 24/7,
w ith zero carbon e mi ssions. Additi o na ll y, nuclear plants run on
ura nium- an e le m e nt so ene rgy-rich that a sing le fu el pe ll e t the
s ize of a fi ngertip co nta in s as much e nergy as 17,000 cubi c feet
of natural gas, 149 ga llons of oi l, o r one ton of coa l- sav in g
the U n ited States nearl y twe lve billi on do llars a yea r in energy
costs. 2 Thus, the federal governme nt mainta ins a stro ng interest
in propping up the nu c lear indu stry, despite the sti gmas a bout
nuc lear w as te. 3
Th e Rocky F lats Pl ant is a nuc lear weapons producti on fac il ity located just sixteen mil es fro m the dense ly populated c ity of
D e nver. 4 D ow C hemi ca l first o pera ted the pl ant under a contract
w ith the fede ral governme nt, and the n R ockwe ll intern ati o na l
Co rpo rati o n acquire d the co ntrac t. 5 However, plant operati o ns
ha lted in 1989 w he n the Fede ra l Bureau of Investi gatio n (F BI)
ra ided th e fac ility and un ea rth ed ind icati o ns of e nvironme nta l
c rim es. 6 Pl a nt w o rke rs mi s ha ndl ed radi oacti ve waste a nd the
co mmunity th eo ri zed that so me of th e waste had bee n po ured
into th e gro und , re leased into the a ir, and permeated th e so il
th ro ug ho ut th e a rea. 7 As thi s news e merged, th e pl ant 's ne ighbo rs saw the ir prope rty va lues plummet. 8 Consequently, in 1990,
the pro perty owne rs fil ed a c lass acti o n suit under Col orado state
to rt law and th e federall y ma nd ated Pri ce-Anderson Act (PAA o r
"the Act"), a lleg ing that th e o perato rs of the nuc lear pl ant neg1igentl y mi sha ndled h igh-threat radi oacti ve and nuclear materi a ls. 9 T he dua l a uth o rity actio n proceeded in hopes of recovering
fo r dam ages ca used by releases of pluto nium and other haza rd o us substan ces. 1o
The PAA, w hi c h was e nacted in 1957 to p ro m ote the growth
and innovati o n of nuc lear e nte rprises, c urre ntly serves as in sura nce coverage to nuc lear power pl ants in the event of an in c ident
o r acc ident. 11 T he Act is des ig ned to protect the nuc lea r indu stry
aga ins t liability c la im s a ri s in g fro m nuclear incid ents w hil e
sti 11 e nsuring compen sati o n cove rage fo r the genera l pub Iic. 12
To promote th e inve stment of nu c lear energy p lants g ive n th e
nex us of lo w liab ili ty and like lih ood for risk, the A ct establishes
4

a no-fault insura nce-ty pe system, in w hi ch the fi rst 12.6 billi on
of payout is industry-fu nded. 13
However, after twenty-fi ve years of liti gati on, th e United
States Court of A ppea ls fo r th e Tenth C ircuit ultim ate ly he ld
th at the plaintiffs in th e Roc ky Flats case did not meet th e criteri a to bring the ir sui t und er th e PAA , a nd that they had to rely
so le ly on Col orado state to rt law and assert a nui sance c la im. 14
Th e co urt he ld th at pl a inti ffs a lleg ing inju ry fro m " lesse r
nu c lear occ urre nces"- th at is, injuri es fa ilin g to m eet th e
PAA's thresho ld of bod ily injury o r property damage- co uld
recover damages unde r state to rt law. 15 Thi s res ul ted in more
tha n $ 1 billion j udg ment fo r a g roup of pl ainti ffs whose injury
was c ha ra cte ri zed as a " lesse r nu c le ar occurrence ." 16 Th e
characterizatio n as a " lesse r nu c lear occ urrence" m ea nt th at
th e dam age at the Rocky Fl ats Pl ant did not constitute enough
harm to tri gger th e PAA co mpensati o n sch em e; as a nu c lear
inc ident, the pl ant was perso na lly liabl e ." 17
Despite how da nge rou s to th e indu stry th at fi g ure may
see m, the lasting consequ ences of the decis ion co uld be even
graver. For insta nce , the Tenth C irc uit 's dec isio n prov id es the
pla intiffs with an o pti o n to c irc um vent the PAA's entire nu clear
lia bil ity reg ime. 18 The dec is io n a ll ows a pla inti ff to fi le a c la im,
rega rdless of th e deg ree of nu c lea r harm a nd elevated PAA
criteri a, w hi ch co uld result in a j ud ge me nt aga inst the nu clear
pl ant and effecti ve ly end th e energy inn ovation takin g place . 19
C itizens injured in so me way by a nu c lear pl ant deserve compe nsati o n and ju sti ce . Yet, in s idin g w ith the pla inti ffs, th e
Tenth C ircuit overturned the PAA's vig ilantl y crafted equ ilibrium of protecting th e pub lic fro m harm c reated by radi oacti ve
material , whil e defy in g the co mpre he ns ive nucl ea r li a bility
reg im e fo r ow ne rs and o perators of nu c lear fac iliti es. 20 Thi s
res ult creates an incenti ve fo r defendants of nuclea r to rt acti ons
to a ll o w Pri ce-A nd e rso n judg m e nts again st th em, whi ch is
like ly prefera bl e to th e liti gati on of a state tort claim .2 1 Whil e
th e Te nth C ircui t's mi s in te rpretati o n of th e " nu clear inc ident"
at Rocky Fl ats res ul ted in a da mages am o unt that exceeded th e
compe nsati o n intenti ona lly a ll ocated fo r thi s ty pe of event by
Co ngress, it a lso contradi cted inth C irc uit and Fi ft h Ci rcui t. 22
Co nsequent ly, th e dec isio n w ill negati ve ly impact inn ovati on
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in an industry critical to essentia l human services such as
energy, power, and national security. 23
The Tenth C ircui t's decis ion renders nuclear market participants susceptib le to a new and undefined li abil ity. Th is
uncertainty has a cascade of negative consequences. First, such
uncertainty threatens to destabilize and weaken the value of the
PAA's compensation system by disrupting the settled expectations of participants and investors in the nuclear market. 24
Second, it discourages added participation and investment in
nuclear energy within the United States .2 s Further, it threaten s
to make the United States an outlier among countries with commercial nuclear energy programs, many of wh ich are governed
by international nuclear li abi lity conventions predicated on
the principles inherent in the PAA. 26 Aside from the political
and industrial consequences stemming from Cook v. Rockwell
International Corp. ,27 the decision may ultimately allow the
court to regulate the industry as a means to modify an industry
that is rapid ly modernizing, effectively amending the definition
of a "nuclear incident" within the PAA.28
Th is Article analyzes the preemption concerns raised by the
Tenth Circu it decision in Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. ,
and the sweep ing outcomes for the nuclear energy industry. Part
II provides background in formation on the PAA , the federal law
that preempts the Tenth Circuit decision, and compares the preemption doctrine in simil ar energy contexts. 29 Part III analyzes
the extensive impacts that the Tenth Circuit's preemption misinterpretation, and current posture of the law from this decision ,
poses for nuclear energy compan ies, the power industries, and
judicial review.30 Part Ill also acknow ledges that whi le this was
a bad judgment with negative repercussions for the legal and
nuclear commun ities, the definition ofa "n ucl ear in cident" in the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) shou ld conform to the related definition of "n uclear damage" in the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuc lear Damage. 3 1 This will ens ure that the
lega l framework from the Cook decision has a limited impact
and is better defined going forward. 32 Commun ities should
receive monetary compensation for injuries permeating out of
nuclear plants. Therefore , the PAA should be amended allowing citizens injured from modern nuclear occurrences to merit
compensation under the li ability regime specifica ll y designated
for that type of injury.

II.

B AC KG ROUN D

A. OV ERVI EW OF THE PRJ CE-ANDERSON A CT
l CENTIVI ZING ENERGY I NNOVATION

(PAA):

Nuc lear power plants and nuclear reactors are often located
with in a few hours ' drive of major cities, like Los Angeles
and New York. 33 The Three Mile Island plant, for examp le, is
located near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with a metropolitan
area rad ius encompassing over 2 million people.34 Such proximity raises questions about the safety of the plant and the cost
resulting from a nuclear accident. Congress enacted the PAA in
1957 to provide answers to such questions. 3 s [n 1957, the United
States wanted to promote the development of nuclear energy to
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decrease dependence on fossil fue ls. 36 The country was developing nuclear weapons, aligning with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), and propping up nuclear power plants ,
and while nuclear innovation posed a number of safety risks, it
was ordered as the first econom ic alternative to coal. 37 Nuclear
power plants emit fewer radioactive materials into the environment than a traditional coal-burn in g plant. 38
Prior to 1957 , an obstacle emerged for the deve lopment
of cleaner energy. To transition from a government control led
industry to a privately operated fac ility conductin g innovative
energy development an enormous amount of in surance was
required. 39 insurers were unwilling and unable to provide risk
coverage to this seem ingly perilous industry whose major product possesses a ll the features of uninsurability. 4 Consequently,
Congress passed the PAA as an amendment to the AEA , ensuring substantia l funds are avai lab le to compensate the public in
the event of an accident. 41
The PAA's success comes from its twofold subsidy on the
nuclear industry. F irst, it limits the a mou nt of primary in surance
that nuclear operators must carry- an uncalculated subs idy in
terms of in surance premiums that they do not have to pay.42
This distorts e lectricity markets by masking nuclear power's
unique safety and sec urity risks, and grants nuclear power an
unfair and undesirable competitive advantage over other energy
a lternati ves. 43 Second, the PAA caps the liability of operators
in the event of a serious accident or attack, leaving taxpayers
responsible for most of the damages beyond. 44
In passing the PAA, Congress capped the amount of li ab ility an energy company cou ld face in the event of an accident.
Through this program, the nuclear energy indu stry maintains
$43.2 billion in li abi li ty coverage by the federal government. 45
Thus, the PAA creates exclusive li abi lity for nuclear operators
for injury arising from a " nuclear incident," and supplies a
large pool of funds to ensure prompt and fair compensation for
citizens physically or economi cally injured. 46 In turn , the PAA
upholds the fra mework for nuclear plant insurance and sets an
upper limit o n industry-wide liabi lity.47 The PAA worked well
when insurance funds allocated under the Act disbursed approximately $71 million in claims and liti gation costs related to the
1979 acc id ent at Three M ile lsland. 48 The Act has proven so successfu l that Congress used it as a model for legislation to protect
the public against potential losses or haim from other hazards. 49
This $ 12.6 billion makes capita l in vestment in the nuclear
energy industry more attractive to in vestors because their risk is
minimized and fixed. so Thus, the PAA incentivizes investment in
an area of the energy industry whose development and inn ovation comes with potentially s ign ificant risks .
Consequently, the Act is a do ubl e-edged sword for the
public that it purports to protect. While the legislation has a
provision to protect the people, it was primarily intended protect
the industry and bolster investor confidence.s 1 Congress carefully crafted the Act to create a federa l nuclear liabi lity regime. s2
The Act protected nuclear fac ility owners and operators from
potentially cripp ling charges aris ing from state tort actions.s 3
For examp le, the Act contain s an exc lusive liability regime and
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a co mpre he ns ive fin a ncia l protecti o n sche me serv ing the dua l
purpose of protecting the public and e ncourag ing nuclear deve lopm e nt. 54 A dditi o nall y, Congress drafted the Act to minimize its
interference w ith state tort law.55 The Act's leg is lative hi story
repeated ly stressed the limited nature of the federal intrusion .56
On the li ab ility fro nt, to fac ilitate prompt a nd equitab le compe nsatio n in the event of a " nuclear incident," the PAA channe ls
liability exc lu sively to the operator, without the need for c la ima nts to prove fa ult on onl y part of the operator or other entiti es
at the fac ili ty. 57 A no th er limitation of the PAA is the definition
of " nu c lear in cident"; the Act defines it broadly as "any occurrence . .. w ithin the United States causing . . . bodily injury,
sickn ess, o r death, or loss of o r dam age to p ro pe rty, arising o ut
of o r resulting from the radi oactive, toxic , o r other hazardo us
prope rti es of source, s pec ia l nuc lea r, o r byproduct materi a l. " 58
The particularity of the wo rd s restrict the type of harm the PAA
prov ides coverage for, and in an era of mod ern technology a nd
advanced nu c lear research , ha rm could be in a lesser or different
form a nd not tri gger the Act.
Despite thi s broad definition of " nu c lear in c id e nt," not
every personal injury su it brought against Com mi ssion li censees triggers the PAA' s compensatio n sc he me unl ess it is an
extrao rdin a ry nuclear occurre nce ("E 0 " ) .59 The accident
ca us in g the harm mu st be s uffic ie ntl y severe to classify as an
ENO. One exa mple where pl a inti ff's claims failed to meet the
ENO criteria was in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 6 0 This
case is s ig nifi cant to current PAA preemption ana lysis because
it revo lves aro und coverage for a nucl ear occ urrence being
within federa l juri sdi ctio n. 61 The PAA issue in Silkwood was
w hether the ame ndm ent impli ed ly preempted punitive damages awarded in a s uit not brought purs ua nt to th e N uc lear
Reg ul atory Co mmi ssion 's ("N RC") E 0 provisions. 62 Th e
Co urt fo und that Co ngress prohibited states from regulating
nuclear safety, but did not prohibit judicial recourse for those
injured by illegal conduct. 63 U ltim ate ly, the PAA exp li c itl y
draws a roadm a p for th e procedural nu a nces assoc iated with
brin g in g a nu c lear claim.

i. Price-Anderson Act Jurisdictional Elements
T he Act has two provis ion s specifically conferring jurisdiction to federal trial courts. One provides that, when there ha
been a nuclear incident, "any indemnitor or other interested person" may petition the federa l district court for a determination as
to whether the liability for th e inc id e nt may exceed the coverage
mandated by the Act. 64 Purs uan t to this secti o n, a federa l di strict
co urt mi g ht find it necessary to s uperv ise distribution from the
indemnity fund .65 The seco nd re leva nt sect ion of the PriceA nderson Act provides in pert inent part:

(2) With respect to any publi c li ab ility action arising out
of or resulting from an extraord inary nucl ear occurrence,
the Un ited States di strict court in the district where the
extraord inary nucl ear occurrence takes pl ace . . . sha ll
have orig in a l juri sd ictio n without regard to the citizens hip of a ny party or th e amount in controversy. Upon
moti o n of the defendant or of the Commi ss ion , any such
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action pending in any State court or United States district
court sha ll be removed or transferred to the United States
district court having venue under this sub-section. 66
The relationship between the PAA and a state tort claim is
hi erarchi cal. For example, the Supre me Court relied o n the PAA
as the primary remedy for address ing state tort c laims in vo lvi ng
the nuclear industry.67 C ircuits agree that the legislati ve hi story
of the PAA indi cates that Congress intended that state tort law be
the basis of sui ts res ulting from nuclear accidents, the Act contains provisions that al ign significant ly with the underlying state
law even in the absence of an E 0 declaration. 68 By extending
the PAA's coverage through the 1988 Amendm ents to the E 0
criteria, Co ng ress exp ress ly g ra nted ri ghts, otherw ise unava ilab le under state tort law. 69

J. PRICE-A NDERSON ACT AMENDMENT OF 1966 AND 1988
Co ng ress has co ntinu a ll y exte nded the timeline of the
PAA's coverage, a nd it has made s ig nifi cant changes to the lang uage in the twenty-two yea rs between 1966 and 1988. First, in
1966, Congress a mended the PAA , req uiring those inde mnifi ed
under the Act to waive com mo n law defenses, like contributory negligence, if an action was raised after an "extraordinary
nuclear occu rrence." 7 Congress expressed concern that aspects
of state tort law, like statutes of limitati on that were too sho rt to
a llow actions following radiation ex posure, could frustrate the
PAA's purpose of co mpen sating victims of nuc lea r incidents. 71
Co ngress believed th is a pproac h refl ected the methodology
fou nd in the orig ina l PAA: " inte rfe rin g with State law to the
minimum exte nt necessary." 72 Furthermore, the leg is lative
hi story for the 1966 A me ndm e nts included that "a c la imant
wo uld have exactly the sa me rights as today under ex ist ing law,
including benefit of a rule of strict li ability if app li cab le State
law so prov ides." 73

°

Following th e eve nts of T hree Mile Is land in 1979,
Congress amended the PAA aga in in 1988. This seco nd change
gran ted U nited Sta tes di stri ct courts o ri g in a l and remova l juri sdi ct ion over " public li ab ility action" which "aris[es] o ut ofor as
result from a nuclear inc id ent." 74 The Act was a mended because
the Three Mile Is land acc ident cou ld not be conso lid ated in to
federa l court s ince it did not reach the level of an "extrao rdinary nuclear incident." 75 Thu s, the 1988 Amendments so lved
this issue by reducing the " extraord in ary" thresho ld at which
the provisions of the PAA would a ppl y, m aking the Act less
ri g id. Means for ac ti on after th e impl eme ntati on of the 1988
A m endm ents in c lud e " lega l li ab ility arisin g o ut of or resulting
from a nuc lear incident," and no longer the requirement to have
an EN0 .76

2.

THE R ELATIONSHIP B ETWEEN THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT

AND THE CONVENTION ON S UPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION

The PAA proved successfu l e noug h with in the United
States to in form intern atio na l regulations on nuclear li abili ty.
The Conve nti on on Suppl ementary Co mpensat ion fo r uclear
Damage (CSC) prov ides a g loba l nucl ear liabili ty and compensati on scheme.77 Its regim e guarantees timely reimbursement
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w hen fac in g particularized injury from intern atio nal nuc lear
energy in c idences. 78 In additi on to maintaining internatio na ll y
agreed upon terms and defi ni tions, the CSC featu res the creation
of an international insurance pool to suppl ement the amo unt
of compe nsation ava ila bl e fo r nuclear damage resulting from
an in c ide nt. 79 Mirroring the principles of the United States '
PA A, the CSC fun ctions as an internationally respected liab ility sta nd ard fo r nuc lear damage adhered to across the g lobe. 80
Therefore, the definition of " nuclear damage" simil arl y encompasses a broader spectrum of li abi li ty for an incident, accident,
or lesser occurrence. 81 However, unlike the spec ifi c " nucl ear
incident" definition inc luded in the PAA , the CSC's definition of
" nuclear damage" in cludes econom ic loss and impa irment of the
enviro nment. 82 Di ffere nces in terminology, such as the exa mple
of " nuc lea r damage," make it eas ier and more math emati ca lly
effic ient to rece ive compensation from a nuc lear accident, which
is less financially devastating to the energy innovati o n within the
nuc lear industry.
The CSC is significant for hav ing borrowed concepts from
th e PAA in its fo rmulation. However, w ith the ad va nce ment
of nuc lea r technology and th e evo luti o n of nuc lear incidences
occurring at pl ants in the United States, the PAA should adopt
the broader defi niti o n from the internationa l compensation plan
that it he lped create so that plaintiffs are likely to be compensated by a federal fund intended fo r this type of harm .

B.

TH E CAS E WITH TH E BILLI ON D OLLAR P AY

SUMMARY OF COOK

v.

Our:

R OCKWELL I NTERNATIONAL CORP.

AND ASSOCIATED CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION

A c hildh ood in Co lorado ofte n co nsists of ma ny outdoor
act iv iti es , s uch as playing in th e mountai ns and sw immin g in
the many lakes and streams. Finding out that those streams we re
contaminated with weapon-grade plutonium wo uld be devastating. This is likely the story fo r anyo ne li ving outs ide of Denver
in the 1970s.
With th e in creased proli fera tion of nucl ear energy, co urts
bega n see in g Iiti gat ion against nu c lear powe r pl ants in th e
area of neg li ge nt handlin g of ma ter ial. 83 Most notab ly, th e
c la im in Cook v. Rockwell In ternational Corp. ste mmed from
the mi shandlin g of radi oacti ve waste at th e nuclear weapons
fac ili ty located nea r downtown De nver. 84 Durin g the Co ld War,
Dow C he mi ca l and Rock we ll Inte rn atio na l Corp. o perated the
pl ant und er contracts with the fede ra l governme nt. 85 Adjacent
prop erty ow ne rs c laim ed ha rm bega n in 1989 , when FBI
agents raided th e plant and un ea rth ed s ig ns of e n vironm enta l
crimes. 86 Ev id ence at tri a l impli ed that pl a nt wo rkers di sposed
of radioactive waste into the grou nd , w he re the waste leaked
into bodies of water; a nd released radi oactive particles into
the a ir, w hi ch then migrated o nto the so il around th e pl a nt. 87
Unfortunate ly, the plant did not have a spotless e nv ironm enta l
legacy prior to 1989 e ith er. Fo r exa mpl e , the hi sto ry of the
pl ant inc luded plutonium fires in 1957 and 1969 that wafted
tox ic smoke over the D enver metropolitan area 88 a nd leak in g
barrels of radioactive waste and other sma ll accidents conta minated downstream communities. 89 In additi on to dimini shed
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hea lth and safety conditions, the contam in ation caused nearby
residenti a l property va lues to decline, promptin g th e property
owners to file a laws uit against the plant operators under both
the PAA and state nui sa nce law. 90
In 2006 , a federa l jury conv icted Dow C hem ica l and
Rockwell Inte rn atio na l Corporatio n o n charges of negligent
co nduct. 91 Two years late r, a Co lorado federa l judge o rd ered
th e co mpani es to pay a total of $926 milli o n in dam ages ,
in c ludin g $5 49 milli o n in prejudgment interest due to extens ive pre-trial delays. 92 The Tenth Ci rcuit vacated that decision
in September 20 10, sidin g w ith the defendants in fi nding that
plutonium conta mination by itself was not adequate ca use
to seek damages und e r the PAA , w hi c h led to the plaintiffs '
appea l o n state law ground s .93
ln 20 15, after twe nty-fi ve years of a complicated law s uit
invo lving radiation forensics , nucl ear experts, a variety of liti gation tri cks,94 and procedura l reve rsa ls and rem and s,95 the Tenth
C ircuit reversed the ho lding aga in in favor of th e prope1ty owners. The Tenth C ircuit he ld the c la im originally bro ug ht und e r
the PAA was inva lid , and the case was alternatively a matte r
of state tort law. 96 The pl a inti ffs in the case were awa rded over
$900 million plus interest, for a total award upwa rds of $ 1 billi on.97 Jnstead of us ing money fro m the fundin g poo l designed to
compensate thi s type of harm , th e award cam e fro m the nuc lear
plant's pocket. .98 The plainti ffs took advantage of this mi sj udgment by aba ndonin g the m echa ni sm s and ben efits pro v id ed
by th e PAA and pursuin g th e background sta te law nui sance
c la im instead.99 In respon se, the defendants arg ued that s uch an
actio n was preempted by the PAA , which the co urt of appeals
ultimate ly rejected. 100 Thus, a ll ow ing non-PAA state law claims
fo r s uch " lesser occurrences" renders the Act's limitatio n o n
aggregate li abili ty meaning less. 101
C. TH E P REEMPT ION D OCTR I E AND ITS APPLI CAT IO

TO

TH E NUCLEAR FI ELD

When state regulation s conflict with a fed era l law, it triggers
Article YI of the U.S. Constitution , which dec lares: " [t]he laws
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof .
. . sha ll be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every
state sha ll be bound thereby, a nything in the Const ituti o n or
laws of a ny State to the co ntrary notwithstanding. " 102 Thus ,
a federal co urt may require a state to stop certain behavior it
be li eves interferes or conflicts with a federal law. 103 This is the
S upre macy C lause, and it g ives rise to what is known as the
doctrin e of federal preempti on. 104 However, appli catio n of th e
pree mpti o n doctrine is rare ly stra ightforwa rd . 105 ln fac t, the
preempti o n doctrine gets extreme ly complicated and contro versia l.1 06 As the E nvironmenta l Law Reporter notes, "ascerta ining
the presence of s uch federal- tate conflicts is large ly a matter
of statuto ry inte rpretat io n ." 107 When determining whether
Congress chose to express ly preempt state law, courts look to
the plain meaning and exp li c it statutory comm and . 108 However,
when Congress fails to express ly address e ither the presence o r
scope of preemption w ithin the statute, courts mu st some how
accommodate the tension between th e competing constitutio nal
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procedures. 109 Courts attempt this by inquiring into the purposes
of the federal statutory scheme and by delving into the congressional intent behind its enactment. 110
This implied preemption presents more complicated questions for courts. Judges must look beyond the language of the
federal statutes to determine whether Congress has occupied the
field in which the state is attempting to regulate, or whether the
enforcement of the state law frustrates the federal purpose. 111 ln
determining whether to infer a congressional design excluding
state regulation , courts first examine the language and legislative
history of the federal statute. 112 Beyond that, they eschew any
rigid formula and look instead to general criteria. For example,
general criteria like the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme and the need for nationally uniform regulation . 113 The
imprecision of these indicia give courts substantial leeway in
determining whether implied preemption should be found in
particular cases. 114
The next shift in the development of the preemption doctrine
occurred during the 1940s. Within a six-year period, the Court
decided Hin es v. Davidowitz 11 5 and Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator
Corp. 11 6 Although both decisions preserved the congressional
intent requirement for finding preemption, taken together they
greatly expanded the permissible scope of the Court's inquiry
into legislative intent. 11 7 The Court in Hines held that preemption was proper where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 11 8 Rice went further, holding that preemptive intent could be inferred from such factors as the pervasive
nature of the federal scheme or a dominant federal interest in the
subject area. 11 9
Subsequently, after 2007 , there was a tendency for
the Supreme Court to err on the side of broadly interpreting preemption as a means to promote judicial efficiency. 120
Conforming to the trend , at the Circuit Court level , when
faced with facts involving state regulations of nuclear facilities , federal regulations prevailed every time. 12 1 The Three
Mile Island incident in Pennsylvania, for instance, intensified
national debate over the merits of nuclear power through the
lens of a preemption scope. 122 To gain control over the future
of energy and power plants, several states enacted statutes to
impose restrictions and conditions on the siting of any new
power reactors within their borders. 123 "While logical , these
state statutory restrictions ignite a legal dilemma as to which of
the federal laws governing nuclear development preempt state
and local regulatory authority." 124
Several cases illustrate the premise that the federal government sought to reign supreme on nuclear safety issues. For
example, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota 125 represents
a federal case wrestling with the preemptive effect of nuclear
provisions of the AEA, where the Eighth Circuit found the state
incapable to impose radiation standards more restrictive than
criteria defined by the Atomic Energy Commission. 126 The preemption analysis in Northern States was more straightforward
in comparison to preemption analysis of the nuclear regulations
on the West Coast. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy
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Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 127 the
Ca lifornia Warren-Alquist Act required conditions for nuclear
plant certification was more than an attempt to minimize radiation hazards. 128 Therefore, the court scrutinized the extent offederal preemption of state ability to control nuclear development
beyond reducing radiation risks. 129 Thus, whether courts apply
a broad and expansive preemption breakdown regarding states '
nuclear regulations, as in Northern States , or a direct language
argument for preemption as in Pacific Legal Foundations , the
rulings bode potentially unwell for enacted state laws attempting to regulate future nuclear energy development. 130 The AEA
preempts laws regulation radiation hazards.
In an attempt to clarify the regulatory power of federal
and state authorities over nuclear development, Congress
added§ 274 to the AEA in 1959. 13 1 This amendment detailed
the procedure by which the AEA could transfer its regulatory
authority over certain types of nuclear material to the states. 132
The PAA prohibited the Commission, however, from ceding its
authority over especially hazardous activities and materials. 133
Additionally, Section (k) of the 1959 amendment expressly preserved all state or local regulatory activities designed "for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. " 134 Thus,
the expressions of congressional intent within the legislative history of the 1959 amendment demonstrated that Congress likely
wished to preempt state law to some degree. 135 Building on this
explicit preemption, in 1988 when Congress enacted the PAA
amendments, it transformed the "Price-Anderson landscape,"
and resolved the tension between exclusive federal regulation of
nucl ear safety and state law compensation for injuries. 136

III. ANALYSIS
To preempt state law causes of action and clarify liability
under the PAA, Congress should amend the PAA by utilizing
the negative impacts from Cook. Individuals should be liable for
lesser " nuclear occurrences" because it will ensure damages are
paid from the fund and protect the longevity ofnuclear innovation .
The Tenth Circuit's misinterpretation of preemption principles calls for an amendment to the PAA that stimulates nuclear
innovation while still heavily compensating the general public.
The Cook case gave the Tenth Circuit an opportunity to paint the
modern preemption stroke on an industry in desperate need of
modernization. ft also gave the Tenth Circuit a chance to clarify
preemption concerns and affirm the rationale surfacing out of
its fellow Circuits. The United States' nuclear programs are
essential to empowering the country. 137 In contrast to the less
reliable wind and solar energy options, nuclear energy provides
the United States with a consistent and steady power source. 138
Despite the advantages to nuclear innovation, hazardous events
contributed to public fear of the industry. 139 However, the accident at Three Mile Island that created skepticism of nuclear
energy was two generations ago. 140 Since then, engineers have
developed designs to avoid such failures. 141 Further, the Three
Mile Island incident expressly met the criteria outlined in the
PAA for liability coverage. 142 With the advancement of nuclear
technology and measures taken to insulate themselves from
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li ability within the industry, Congress and the regulators are at a
crossroads with the PAA and the terms and technical definitions
fro m the l 950's that it encompasses. 143 Based on the confining
procedural criteria of the PAA, and the way a pl ai nti ff may on ly
ra ise a PAA claim if the techni ca l benchmarks are satisfied, the
Tenth C ircuit in Cook v. Rockwell int '/ Corp. misinterpreted
preempti o n principles. Yet, in exa minin g the co nseq ue nces
of th e Tenth C ircuit's rationale in Cook, it is first esse nti a l to
exami ne preemption concern s to understa nd how th e Tenth
Circuit esta bli shed the ho lding that directly co ntradi cts that of
other Circuits- reconci ling bad fac ts and creating conseq ue nti al
law. After exa mining the signifi cant impacts and w heth er the
decision was preem pted , it is clear the dec ision precipitates an
essential amendment to the PAA that will in turn protect nuc lear
pl a nts from hav ing to pay billi o ns in damages for mere occurrences, and further protect nuclea r innovatio n.

A.

THE T ENTH CIRCU IT D EC ISION IN COOK IS

SIGNiFICANT FOR CONFLICT! G WITH J UD ICIAL
P RECEDE T, C ONGRESS IONAL I NTENT, AND FOR OP ENING
THE LITI GAT ION FLOODGATES

The Cook dec ision is significant because it contradicts other
C ircuits, unravels congressional intent rega rding the federal law,
and widens the judicial door by creating the option to circ umvent the PAA with a nuclear liability claim. The nucl ear industry
in vested in innovation by trusting the PAA's nuclear li ability
regime. 144 The Tenth Circ uit 's dec ision j eopardi zes the industry
by creating new risks, in addition to the dangers associated with
th e acti vity on its face. 145 For example, there is a real pro bability
that nucl ear owners and operato rs, and thu s, governm ent entiti es, could be burd ened with sig nifi cant judgments- perhaps
up wards of billions of dollars- in favor of plaintiffs who may
not have suffe red harm that Congress deemed significant enough
to warrant compensation under th e PAA. 146 I f courts rely on
Cook in cases of all eged harmful occurrences co mpli ance with
the federal safety standards would not prov id e any protectio n. 14 7
C iti es could be subj ect to million s of doll ars in da mages, as
assessed by a lay jury, even though the hazard may constitute an
undetectable amount, like in th e Three Mile Island accident. 148
While the creation of new risks could be extensive, they are still
hypothetica l. Concrete applicatio n of the dec ision's significance
begins with its lack of precedent.

J. COOK R EPRESENTS AN U NPRECEDENTED DECISION
The Cook court 's decision represents a sp lit with the Fifth
Circuit and is at odds with the reasoning of other C irc uits to hear
a similar matter. 149 For instance , the Tenth C ircuit com pl ete ly
disagreed with the ho lding of Cotroneo, and instead fo und suppo rt in the reaso ning of the di ssen t in Cotroneo. 150 The Tenth
C ircuit de parted from other C irc uit dec is io ns w he n choos ing
between a sui t under PAA or under state tort law. There have
been numerous nuclea r li ability cla im s tri ggered by narrow ly
tailored state statutes within the other C irc uit. 151 Consistently,
th e court has held that a pl ainti ff w ho asserted a PAA claim could
not pursue a freestanding state-l aw claim outside the PAA based
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on th e same alleged facts. 152 Si mil arl y, the N inth Circuit 153 has
relied on the language of the PAA taking precedence over state
law in cases that c lose ly para lleled the fac ts of Cook. The N inth
C ircuit consistently he ld that "[t]he PAA is the excl usive means
of compensating victim s fo r any and a ll claims arisi ng o ut of
nuclear incidents." 154
ln departing fro m other Circ uits, the Tenth C ircuit's decision wi ll c rea te un certa inty in th e ap pli cati o n of the PAA .
A ppli cat io n a mbi g uity wi ll pa rti c ul ar ly impact a number
of nu clea r indu stry pl ayers th at are located within the Tenth
C irc uit, includin g De pa rtm ent of E ne rgy 's (" DOE") Waste
Iso lation Pilot Pl ant fac ility (th e natio n's onl y disposal fac ility
fo r hi g h-l eve l nuc lear waste) , the Sandi a Nati o nal Laborato ry,
and th e Los A la mos Nati o nal Laboratory, a ll of whi c h a re
importan t nati ona l sec urity fac iliti es. 155 S impl y by v irtu e of
their phys ica l location, fac iliti es in the Te nth C ircuit now face
unce rta inty a bout their pote ntial liability expos ure even if a
nuclear incident never occurs. In addition to be ing an unprecedented dec ision and co ntrad ictin g other Circuits on analogous
cases, the Cook decision questions Congress 's intent in determinin g what scenarios merit coverage.

2. THE COOK D ECISION U NRAVELS CONGRESSIONAL I N TEN T
In Cook, the Tenth C ircuit substituted its views fo r the judgment of Congress. The PAA is a n exampl e of a legislative economi c scheme, in whi ch Congress has sought " to structure and
accommodate th e burden s and benefits of economi c li fe." 156 It is
clear that Congress intended the PAA to provide a safety net of
private insurance for government indemnifi cati on and claims of
" publi c li ability" w hich arise from a " nucl ear incident." 157 T hi s is
clear in part because Congress's amendment to the PAA in 1988
includes a ll nucl ear incidents with fe dera l jurisdicti on and prohibits punitive awards in certain circumstances. 158 Additionall y,
the PAA does not allow recovery for cla ims such as psychi atri c
damages or emotio nal distress not connected to physical bodily
injury. 159 Moreover, as the Tenth C ircuit expla ined in another
context, "the inclusion of certa in remedies and the exclu s ion of
others under the federal scheme would be co mpl etely unde rmined" if pl a inti ffs remained "free to obtain remedies unde r
state law that Congress rejected." 160 The same principle holds
here: Congress sp ec ificall y delineated the claims that pl ainti ffs
may bring re lated to nucl ear harm under th e PAA . 16 1 Permittin g
pl ainti ffs to m ake an overt end-run aro und th e federal nuclear
liabili ty system to bring alternative claims under state law wo uld
undermine the entire federal schem e.
Then-Judge Gorsuch , in writing the Cook o pini on, di scussed
Congress 's intent in draftin g the PAA. 162 While he justified hi s
narrow interpretati on of intent by onl y looking at p articular areas
of the language , he neg lected the bi gger indu stry moti va ti o n
that Congress preserved , as shown in the many amendments to
extend the PAA. 163 In substituting the court of a ppea ls opini o n
for the intent of Congress, Judge Gors uch leve rages an angle
to the preempti o n analys is fo r strengthening hi s rationale. 164
Neverthe less, he mi ssed th e mark in analyzing the preemptio n
doctrin e, whi ch determined the outco me of hi s dec ision . 16 5 The
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Tenth Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court disfavors preemption , a nd that the text of the PAA " merely affords a federal forum
when a nucl ear incident is 'assert[ed]' ." 166 However, " [n]othing
in thi s la ng uage speaks to w ha t happens when a nuclear incident
is alleged but unproven. " 167 In addition to ex plicitly contradicting the intent of Congress and mi s interpreting preemption principles, Cook also could widen the litigation gate a nd lower the
thres hold for bringing a nucl ear liability claim to court. Notably,
in dec iding that the PAA is no t a complete preemption statute,
the opinion omitted any di sc uss ion of several cases that the
defenda nts reli ed on in support of their pree mption argument. 168
The statutory terminology and nuclear labe ling in the PAA
contributed to the preemption misinterpretation . 169 In its holding, the Tenth Circuit desig nated alleged but unproven " nuclear
incidents" as " lesser nuclear occurrences" and stated , " it's
hard to conjure a reason why Congress would a llow plaintiffs
to recover for a full pa noply of injuries in the event of a large
nuclear incident but insist they get nothing for a lesser nuclear
occurrence." 170 Likewise, the PAA does not independently
define " occurrences," " nucl ear occurrences," o r " lesser nuclear
occurrences." 171 There is hi s torical fluctuation on broadenin g
and narrow ing technical terms in order to establish preemption
interpretations. In acknowledging historical preemption concerns presented in nuclear driven cases, the s tandards articulated
by Hines and Rice, for example, were so broadly phrased th at
congressional intent to preempt could be found in any area of
comprehensive federal legis lati o n. 172

3.

COOK OPENS COURT D OORS TO CIRCUMVENT PAA

Should future courts confronting a state law face-off with
the PAA choose to follow the reasoning of Cook, many state
laws a imed at limiting or conditioning nuclear growth will prevail in federal court. 173 After Coo k, anyone can sue a nucl ea r
power pl a nt without needin g to satisfy th e nuclear inc ident
requirements o utline d by the PAA. If plaintiffs prove they s uffered from a " nuclear incident," they are e ntitled to relief unde r
the PAA , s ubj ect to certain limitations provi s ion s built in " to
ensure that liabilities arising from large nuclear incidents don 't
s hutter the nuclear industry .... " 174 However, if the plaintiffs
cannot prove a " nuclear incident" under the PAA, but can prove
some sort of " lesser occurrence" or " lesser state law nui sance,"
th ey ma y proceed on their state law claims. 175 Thus, plaintiffs
can circumvent coverage fanned out by the PAA. There is now
the like lihood that owners and operators could be individually
charged with s ign ificant judg ments without a cap- potentiall y
in the billions of doll a rs- in favor of litigants who may not
have s uffered harms tha t Cong ress deemed s ignificant enough to
warrant compensation und e r th e PAA. 176 Even if plaintiffs were
unsuccessful , without the framework of th e PAA , such cases
may s it in court for years in protracted , complex , and expensive
litigation. 177 It is clear that the authority under state tort law
could lead to a better pay out. 178 In examining th e s ignificant
impacts Cook may have on judicial efficiency and the industry,
the consequences should stimulate an amendment to the definition of a " nuclear incident. " 179
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B.

TH E PAA SHOULD HAV E PREEMPTED STATE TORT

L AW rN THE T ENTH CIRCU IT

The Tenth Ci rcuit 's dec is io n co nflicts with every other
C ircuit that has considered the preempti ve nature of the PAA. 180
The quest ion for the court hin ged on the determination of
whether the challenged state law is one that the federal law was
intended to preempt.
In lookin g beyond the express language of federal statutes
to determine whether Congress has occupied the field in which
the state is attempting to regulate, whether a state law directly
conflicts with federal law, or whether enforcement of the state
law might frustrate federal purposes, the Tenth Circuit mi sstated
this analysis . If the court looked to the pervasiveness of the
regulating federal scheme, the federal interest at stake with the
PAA , and the danger of frustrating federal goals in determining
whether a challenged state law can stand , the majo rity would
arrive at a diffe rent holding.
The PAA's liability scheme mirrors the preempti on doctrine,
under which "the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary" that no rmal state law c laim s a re converted into federal
c laims for efficient and equitable reso lutions . 181 As the Court
acknowledged in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, the PAA
is analogous in its preemptive force to another federal legislative system under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Labor Management Relations
Act. 182 Moreover, the Tenth C ircuit should have applied the
analysis from Neztsosie to their decision in Cook. 183 The Court
in Neztsosie observed that the 1988 Amendments provide "clear
indications of the congressional aims of speed and effic ie ncy" in
the resolution of claims. 184 Federal legislative systems that create
exclusive federal causes of action , such as ERJSA and the PAA,
are more appropriately analogues than the Class Action Fairness
Act, which the Tenth Circuit cited by analogy in Cook. 185
Cong ress inte nded for the federal government to regulate
the safety aspects of the construction and operation of e nergy
facilities and power plants. 186 This rationale is consistent
with Sixth a nd Seventh Circuit holdings and their assessment
of intent. Those C ircuits found that Congress did not wish to
create a sta nd-alone federal tort for a public liability action . 187
The analysis provided that the s ubstantive rules for decision in
such action s hall be deri ved from state law, which , despite its
prior preemption concern , might e ncompass s ubstantive issues
like the requisite duty of care and the burden of proof for causation.1 88 Therefore, the vision was for state law to augment the
federal regime substa ntivel y, not circumvent it.

J.

THE S UPREME COURT'S R OLE IN THE T ENTH CIRCUIT'S

PREEMPTION ANALYSIS

The Tenth C ircuit's reliance o n Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 189
is incorrect. After examining both th e preemption doctrine
generally and its application in the nuclear fi e ld specificall y, the
opinion in Silkwood maintain s di stin g uishable authority over
the Cook decision . 190 In Silkwood, the Court, vo ting 5-4, found
that fed era l law did not impliedly preempt a $ 10 million dollar punitive da mages award against a nuclear power pl ant for
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neg li gently all ow ing empl oyee, S ilkwood, to be conta min ated
w ith pluto nium . 191 Whil e Silkwood held that Congres had no
intention, w hen it amended the AEA of 1954, of forbidding the
States to provi de remed ies fo r inj uries fro m radi ation. Congress
did wish to protect the nu c lear industry fro m fr ivo lous c laim s
th at lacked sc ientific bac kin g . 192 Addi tio na ll y, Silkwood was
decided in 1984, fo ur yea rs before the 1988 A me ndments to th e
PAA, w hi ch esta bli s hed the li a bility action as the new and so le
fe dera l ca use of ac ti on. 193 Thus, the Tenth C ircuit needed to di stinguish Cook fro m Silkwood since Cook posse sed the elements
for com plete pree m ptio n.
T he Su preme Co urt made clea r that federa l law compl ete ly
occupi es the fie ld of nuclear safety and preem pts state action in
thi s area. T herefore, courts be li eved that fe dera l law simil arl y
di ctates th e du ty a defenda nt owes to a pl a intiff in a publi c
li a bility action. 194 Regardin g radi ati on injuri es in Silkwood,
pree mptio n sho uld not be based o n grounds "that the Federa l
Government has so compl etely occupi ed th e fie ld of safety" that
state remedi es are precluded . 195 In stead the Co urt must determine if " there is an irreco nc il a ble confli ct between the fe dera l
a nd state stand ard s," or if the impos iti on of sta te standard s
fo r damages interfe res wi th the purpose of the fe deral law. 196
However, it is unc lear ifthere is a di ffe rence between occup y in g
the fi e ld and confli cting between standard s in thi s contex t. Thus,
any li a bili ty ac ti on w ith significa nt federa l ingredi ents sati sfy in g
pree mptio n is consistent w ith the fac ts all eged to have occurred
in Cook at the Rocky Flats Pl ant.
Despite th e S upreme Court g iv ing w ide latitude to the states
to regul ate nucl ea r power w ithin the ir bo rde rs and the significance of Silkwood, the Cook dec isio n es ta bl is hes new parameters
governing preemp tion in th e energy neld . 197 For examp le, the
Tenth C ircuit erred w hen it downpl ayed its preempti on ana lys is
just beca use the defendants fa il ed to in vo ke impli ed preemption
doctrine a nd a ppeared to di sc la im re li ance on it. 198 The Tenth
C ircui t a lso re li ed o n the fac t th at beca use both co mpani es
defl ected o n conflict preempti on prin c ipl es by not address ing
them, and the poss ibility of using pree mpti on as an affirm ati ve
defense, th at th e defendants fo rfe ited any a ppli cati on of preempti on. 199 Regardless, just because the defendants a ppea red to
re linqui sh the argument of preemptio n as an affirmati ve defe nse,
s hould not mea n that preemption di d not ex ist in thi s case. 200
Unlike in Silkwood, state standards interfe re w ith th e purpose of
the PAA in Cook. 20 1 T herefore, the Tenth C ircui t's omi ss ion of a
fe dera l preemptio n argument is stro ngest w hen it hinges on the
fac t that th e pl a intiffs fail ed to meet th e PAA criteri a of be ing a
nuc lea r inc ident. 202 However, the Te nth C ircuit did not re ly o n
thi s as th e ir j ustification.203
Even in circum sta nces outside of the nuclear inc ident are na,
if any state reg ul ati o n or law co nfl icts w ith a nationa li zed po li cy
it may be pree m pted . In American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi,204 the S upreme Court co nside red the constituti o na lity of a Ca li fo rni a law des igned to help Ca li forn ia Holocaust
s urv ivors co ll ect o n unpa id in s ura nce c la im s fro m Ge rm a n
in surance compani es .205 Despite the a bsence of any c lear statement preempting state laws such as Ca li fo rni a's, the Court fo und
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that the state law confl icted wit h nationa l poli cy and "st[ood] in
the way of fe dera l, dipl omatic obj ectives." 206
Additi o na ll y, the Tenth Circui t leveraged pl a in mea nin g to
omi t preempti on consideration in Cook. T he narrow ly tai lored
defi ni tio n of a " nuc lear inci dent" contributed to Judge Go rsuc h 's
mi sin terpretation of preemption. As di scussed a bove, the scope
of co mpensab le c la im s under the PAA is c irc um scribed by the
Act 's definiti o n of " nuc lea r in c ident" - i.e. , "any occ urre nce .
.. ca us ing . . . bodil y inj ury, sickness, death, o r loss of or da mage to property a ris ing out of or res ulting fro m the rad ioactive,
tox ic , or oth er haza rd o us prope rties of nu c lea r mate ri a l. " 207
As a matter of law and un til th e Cook case, the defi ni tio n of
" nuc lea r inci dent" establ ished the thres ho ld for asserting a co m pensab le inj ury fro m a re lease of radi ati on.208 A pl ain t iff w ho
cann ot demo nstrate bodil y inj ury or property d amage as defin ed
by th e PAA cann ot meet the pre requi sites fo r a li abili ty acti o n,
and thu s ca nnot mainta in any actio n fo r a radi ation-re late d
c laim .209 The refore, wh en the c la im in Cook sati sfi ed w hat th e
Tenth C ircuit dee med as a " lesser nu clear occurrence," the court
a rg ued that p laintiffs fa il ed to meet th e PAA c riteria, a nd thu s ,
e limin ated a pree mpti o n argum e nt. 210 T he a mbi g uity in th e
definit ion of th e te rm " lesser nuc lea r occurre nce" is a criti ca l
pro ble m emerg ing fro m the Cook dec is ion. Given the evo lv in g
nature of the nuc lear indu stry, th e defi niti on permi tting coverage
under the PAA is too na rrow and has co ntribu ted to the remova l
of the PAA auth ority and the unprecedented da mage aw ard. 211
Mov in g fo rw ard , co urts s hould co ns ider th e definiti o n of a
nuclear incident more broadl y w he n looking to apply PAA fund s
fo r li a bili ty coverage.
T he Tenth C irc uit s ho uld have never been a bl e to justi fy
re li a nce on state law fo r thi s matte r. R adi atio n ex pos ure a nd
impro per handling of nuc lear waste has the same consequ ence in
Co lo rado as in Florida o r New York. The Tenth C ircui t's acti o ns
illu stra te one of the reasons fo r fe dera l preemptio n: the iss ue
is too compl ex to pl ace in the ha nds of ap pl y in g va ri ed sta te
law ca uses o f ac ti o n.212 Whethe r o r not co urts co uld use s tate
law causes of ac ti o n and th e ir own standard of ca re to regul ate
nu clear safety through huge moneta ry awa rds was the unde rl yin g po li cy issue addressed by th e S upre me Court in Silkwood.
Th at was th e " te ns ion" the majo ri ty o pini o n fo un d Cong ress
a ll owed w he n it did no t c reate a fe de ra l ca use of actio n in
th e statute. Th e Cook ve rdi ct is exactl y the ev il fea red by th e
Silkwood di ssenters. 213 Whil e the S upre me Co urt 's ana lys is of
preempti on questio ns in Silkwood demonstrates a willing ness to
a llow greater state regul ati on of th e nuc lear energy industry tha n
that w hi ch had previous ly been permi ss ibl e under the Northern
States dec isio n, there is a shi ft at th e C ircuit leve l to take bac k
the federa l rul e w hen a nuc lear in c ident is in vo lved. As a res ult,
Cook obscured both the bas is for its own parti c ul ar outcome, as
we ll as the facto rs we ighed by the Court in deci din g pree mp tion
cases in the nuc lear fie ld in general.

II

C.

D EST RUCTI VE

Co

SEQUE CES FOR TH E N UCL EAR

I N D USTRY AND J U DI CIAL E FFI CIEN CY

Fo r th e pas t severa l d eca des , a hi atus o n buildin g new
nuclear-power pla nts stymi e d the nu c lea r indu stry.214 Th e reaso ns for th e ha lt in constru c ti o n have inc luded pu bli c o utrage
ove r th e T hree Mil e is land m e ltd ow n, in c reas in g reg ul a ti on,
a nd pl a nt o pe rators' need to in s ure aga in st a multitude of
ri s ks. 215 N uc le ar e ne rgy compani es in vested in thi s indu stry in
r e li a nce of th e PAA's th oroug h li a bility reg im e. 216 Th e Te nth
C irc uit ' s o pini o n e na bl es co mmuniti es a nd peo pl e to c irc umvent th e PAA , with its puniti ve ca p, and bring a c laim unde r
state to rt la w, whi ch could be fata l to th e indu stry. Co mpani es
a lrea d y heav il y in ves ted in th e nu c lea r market ca n do littl e
to miti gate thi s new ri sk. A nd co mpa ni es no t yet in veste d in
th e U nite d Sta tes nu c lear m a rket w ill be di sco uraged to parti c ipate , in vest, or furth er e xpand- a result prec ise ly contrary
to c o ng ress ion a l and exec uti ve b ra nc h policy a nd inte nt. 217
A dditi o na ll y, the Te nth Circ uit 's dec is io n threa te ns to destabili ze the g lo ba l m arke t fo r nu c lear e ne rgy, w hi ch is an impo rtant
c o mpo ne nt of the U nited S ta tes ' e ne rgy mi x, p a rti cul a rl y in
li g ht of c lim a te c ha nge co ncern s. N o t o nl y does the deci s ion
put press ure o n furth e r in vestment in Am eri ca n nuc lea r faciliti es , it a lso run s co unter to inte rn a ti o na ll y acce pted nu c lea r
li a bility sta nd a rd s .218 Co mpa ni es a re un w illing to parti c ipate
in th e nu c lear m a rke t in countri es w here o perato r li ab ili ty and
minimum cl a im re quireme nts do no t ex ist. 219 Fo r exa mpl e,
Indi a has no t foll owed the inte rnati o na l nuc lear li ability regula ti o ns beca use its nu c lea r li a bili ty law prov ides , among other
things , th a t op era to rs may have a ri g ht of reco urse aga in st suppli e rs fo r nucl ear d a m ages. 220
Th e la ck of li a bility reg ul ati o n co nflicts with th e inte rna ti o na l no rm of c ha nne lin g a ll nu c lea r respo ns ibility to th e
o perator. A nd no t s urpri sin g ly, th e po te nti a l fo r nu c lea r suppli e r li a bili ty in Indi a has ha d the effect of di sco urag ing m any
nucl ear s uppli e rs fro m engag ing in th e Indi a n nuc lear ma rket,
inhibi t in g th a t m a rk et 's g ro w th .22 1 Co nsequ e ntl y, th e Tenth
C irc ui t's dec is io n to permit certa in state to rt c la im s fo r " lesser
nu c lea r occ urre nces" could we ll intro du ce a s imil ar m a rketd a mp e nin g effect in to th e U nite d States th a t In d ia ex perie nced .222 lt unl e as hes po te nti a ll y s ig nifi ca nt a nd un ce rtain
li a bility fro m th e co nstra ints of th e fe de ral sta tute des ig ned
to c urb it, di sco urag in g d o m es ti c a nd fo re ig n acto rs fro m
pa rti c ipa tin g in th e market. ln th e process , th e United S tates
" co uld lose co ns id era bl e influ ence ove r sta nd a rds gove rnin g
safe ty a nd was te m a nage m e nt" a nd eve n a seat at th e nu c lea r
no nproli feratio n di sc ussion ta bl e.223 The w o rld m ay be un w illin g to m ove towa rd pote nti a ll y safer des ig ns. In add iti o n to
stee rin g th e pri vate sector away fro m nuc lear in vestme nt, th e
Cook d ec is io n w id e ns the judic ia l d oor fo r mo re liti gati o n.224
B eca use of thi s new ly created fra m ewo rk, th e s ize of th e verdi c t, a nd future inte rpretati o ns of the PAA's preemptive effect
(o r lac k t he reof) , lega l ana lys is m ov in g fo rw ard should di sting ui sh Cook, a nd loo k to redefin e the c rite ri a of th e PAA in lin e
w ith inte rn ati o na l co mpensati o n co nventi o ns.
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D. SI LVE R Lr IN G :
PAA AMEN DMENT

JuDICIAL CATASTROPH E STIMULATES

The Cook decision rep resents a s ignifi cant departure fro m
ex isting case law, whi ch ho ld s that all egations even po tenti a ll y
fa lling under the PAA preempted a ll state law claims based on
ha rm a ll egedl y caused by ex pos ure to or conta minati o n fro m
radioacti ve material s. 225 O ne positi ve as pect is that w hil e the
Tenth Circui t dec ision in Cook is preempted by federal law and
generates grave consequences fo r the nuclear energy indu stry, it
may ultimate ly stimul ate an additi ona l amendm ent to the PAA,
as a means to regulate coverage of an industry that is ra pidly
moderni z in g. An amendm ent to the techni ca l definiti o ns and
cri teria w ithin the PAA could ensure that a dec ision like Cook
does not occ ur in the fu ture. In amending the PAA, 226 Congress
was we ll aware that the PAA compensation system must operate
as a consistent pa rt of a larger federal framework governin g th e
safe use of nuc lear ene rgy.227 Congress knew that "[n]um erous
federa l questions wo uld necessa ril y ari se in the course of liti gati on unde r thi s Act, and questions must be resolved co nsistently
w ith the pervas ive federa l scheme."22 8
The definiti o n of a " nuc lear incident," as origina ll y promul gated in the AEA, needs to be updated to confo rm to th e
re lated definiti o n of " nu c lea r damage" in th e Conventi o n on
S upplementary Compensati o n (CSC) .229 That way, w hen there
is a nucl ear incident at a pl ant, a communi ty may rece ive federal
fund s fo r the harm beca use the federal li ability will cover even
a nuclear occ urre nce, w hi ch is less than an inc ident. Further,
Congress sho uld adopt the report lan guage c larifyin g th at a
" nuclear inc ident" under th e fra mewo rk of the PAA covers any
re lease of radi oacti vity in excess of regul ato ry limits. Adopting
a fed eral in c ident sta ndard as th e liability action sta ndard of
care harm onizes federa l preempti on w ith precedent. Ul timate ly,
Congress sho uld ame nd the PAA to compl ete ly preempt state
law causes of acti on, but a lso to clarify that publi c liability under
the PAA sho ul d apply to lesser " nuclear occurrences." Such an
amendm ent wo uld close th e loophol e illu strated in Cook and
he lp the PAA better achi eve its goa ls .230 Adhering to the techni ca l crite ri a of the CSC w ill strengthen Uni ted States nu c lea r
safety credibili ty domesticall y and intern ati o nally.
The defe ndant's duty is to compl y with the federal inc ident
definiti o n stand ards through whi ch the compl ete federal preempti o n of nuc lea r safety is effectuated.23 1 If the definin g language
and compensab le criteri a modifi es in para ll e l fas hi o n w ith th e
industry 's inn ovati on, Congress 's sche me to provi de coverage to
the nuc lear community w ill remain intact.
CONCLUSION

G iven the de ni a l of cert iora ri , th e Te nth C ircuit dec is ion
expands the scope of liability fo r nuc lear power defe ndan ts in
PAA cases, w here the criteri a fo r PAA coverage is not met, and
a ll ows pl a inti ffs to preva il und er state to rt law. However, the
Tenth C ircuit sho uld have fo und pl a intiff's c la ims preempted by
fe dera l law fo r occupy ing th e fi e ld of safety compensation and
fru strating the federa l purpose. A nd w hil e the decision fos ters an
array of negative impacts to the nuc lear industry, it precipitates
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the need to address the techni ca l defin itions and criteria of the
Pri ce-Anderson Act. Upon amend ing the definiti o n of a " nuc lear
inc ide nt," pursuant to th e lang uage in th e Co nventi on of

S upp le menting C ompe nsation, the PAA will res ume th e a llencompass ing ro le that Congress intended a nd preve nt future
judi cia l re liance on Cook.
(i
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